In re: El Aemer El Mujaddid by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-17-2014 
In re: El Aemer El Mujaddid 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"In re: El Aemer El Mujaddid" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 424. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/424 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
ALD-202-E        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
                                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1861 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  EL AEMER EL MUJADDID (Ex. Rel/Fomerly AEMER K.C. EL), 
           Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 1-12-cv-07750) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
April 15, 2014 
 
Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 17, 2014 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 El Aemer El Mujaddid, a.k.a. Aemer K.C. El, submits a petition for a writ of 
mandamus.1  He cites, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 1651; Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure; the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771; and various 
statutory and constitutional provisions.  He seeks a writ to compel the District Court to 
                                              
1 El also submits a motion for permission to file a petition longer than that allowed under 
Rule 21(d).  We grant it, and we consider the entirety of the petition, including its exhibit.   
 
 
“process,” in compliance with Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
a criminal complaint against a retired state or local judge for peonage under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1581.  He seeks unspecified relief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb, and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  Lastly, he seeks a writ to compel a transfer of his 
District Court case from the Camden Vicinage to the Trenton or Newark Vicinage.        
 We will deny El Aemer El Mujaddid’s petition.  To the extent that he petitions for 
a writ of mandamus independently of 18 U.S.C. § 3771, see, e.g., Petition at 10 (citing 28 
U.S.C. § 1651), we conclude that he does not overcome the high hurdle for such relief.  
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy.  See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 
(1976).  Within the discretion of the issuing court, the writs traditionally may be “used . . 
. only ‘to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to 
compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.’”  Id. (citations omitted).  
To obtain such relief, a petitioner must show that “(1) no other adequate means exist to 
attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and 
indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.”  Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).    
 El Aemer El Mujaddid cannot make the required showing.  The District Court had 
no obligation to “process” the federal complaint for peonage that he presented.  Under 
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge presented with a complaint 
 
 
establishing probable cause must issue an arrest warrant to an officer authorized to 
execute it.  However, a judge is charged with determining whether probable cause 
actually exists.  See Giorenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).  It is unclear 
from the document that El Aemer El Mujaddid presented whether probable cause existed; 
there are checkmarks next to probable cause is found and probable cause is not found.  
More fundamentally, however, private citizens have no right to have a criminal complaint 
filed or to institute criminal prosecutions in federal court.  See United States v. Panza, 
381 F. Supp. 1133, 1138 (W.D. Pa. 1974).  El Aemer El Mujaddid asserts that he did not 
want to prosecute the charges himself.  We understand that; however, we note that 
whether to initiate proceedings or prosecute was not a decision for him or the District 
Court.  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (explaining that, 
generally, the decision to federally prosecute “rests entirely” in the broad discretion of the 
Attorney General and the United States Attorneys).   
El Aemer El Mujaddid also does not show an indisputable right to relief under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act or Bivens because of the District Court’s actions.2  
Furthermore, he shows no basis for a transfer of his District Court case. 
While mandamus relief is available under a different, and less demanding, 
standard under 18 U.S.C. § 3771 in the appropriate circumstances, see 18 U.S.C. 
                                              
2 To the extent that he uses his petition for a writ of mandamus to challenge the District 
Court’s ruling on a separate mandamus petition, we note that mandamus is not a 
substitute for appeal.  See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004) 
(citations omitted); Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).   
 
 
§ 3771(d)(3); Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Rigas, 409 F.3d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 2005), it is not available to El Aemer El 
Mujaddid here.  Even assuming that El Aemer El Mujaddid is a crime victim for whom 
mandamus and other relief is available under § 3771 (a generous assumption based on the 
ambiguous evidence he proffers regarding an alleged violation of a federal peonage 
statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (defining “crime victim”)), he has in no way shown that 
he is being deprived of the rights accorded crime victims, see  id. at § 3771(a).  
Furthermore, he does not even seek enforcement of those rights, relying on 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3771 instead to win other forms of relief.      
For these reasons, El Aemer El Mujaddid is not entitled to mandamus relief, so we 
will deny his petition.3   
                                              
3 As we stated above, we grant his motion for relief from the page limitations.   
